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Comment

A Deep Breath Before the Plunge: Undoing
Miranda's Failure Before It's Too Late

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona1 has been and
will be a lightning rod for controversy so long as it remains in effect.
The decision has been lauded for its apparent protection of individual
dignity from overzealous police and criticized as an unwarranted shackle
on legitimate law enforcement techniques. Nevertheless, Mirandahas
weathered the storms and, thanks to the Supreme Court's decision in
Dickerson v. United States,2 has endured. Unknown to most proponents
or detractors, however, Miranda has had little effect on what actually
occurs during police interrogations. The reasons for this are varied.
First, by creating numerous exceptions to Miranda,the Supreme Court
has whittled away at the protections Miranda sought to provide.
Second, Miranda rights are frequently waived by suspects.
Waiver of Mirandarights is a result of a fundamental flaw in the wellintentioned scheme. The warnings are recited to the suspect and then
the suspect is left with choices-remain silent, ask for an attorney, or

1.
2.

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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talk to the authorities. Although the suspect may be aware that he has
various options available to him, the warnings have not supplied him
with the appropriate criteria to govern his choice. This Comment
proposes that a suspect should be required to meet with counsel prior to
custodial interrogation and to have counsel accompany him during the
interrogation.
II.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASES

A.

The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
One of the first cases to deal with confessions was Brain v. United
States. 3 The Court in Bram held that the use of the statement of an
accused is governed by the "portion of the Fifth Amendment ...
commanding that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.'"'4 However, the Fifth Amendment's SelfIncrimination Clause would not be applied to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for another fifty years.5
In the interim, the Court fashioned a voluntariness test from the Due
Process Clause in an effort to exclude coerced statements that were
deemed untrustworthy.6
Ultimately, under the totality-of-the-circumstances test, the voluntariness test has evolved into a consideration of "both the characteristics of
the accused and the details of the interrogation."7 Should a court
determine that the defendant's "will was overborne," the confession is
deemed involuntary, and its introduction into evidence is barred.'
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the Court used the
voluntariness test to exclude untrustworthy confessions that resulted
from the most flagrant forms of coercion, such as threats of imminent
harm,9 lack of physical comforts such as food or sleep,10 repeated or
extended periods of interrogation," limited access to counsel or

3. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
4. Id. at 542 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
5. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6-11 (1964). Although this Comment employs the
phrase "Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause," the clause is binding on the states
through incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
6. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
7. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
8. Id.
9. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
10. Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
11. Chambers,383 U.S. at 948.
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friends, 2 lengthy
and illegal detention, 3 and individual weaknesses
14
or incapacities.
B.

The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel

Following incorporation of the Due Process Clause through the
Fourteenth Amendment, 5 the Court considered the admissibility of
confessions in light of the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment
provides that the accused in a criminal prosecution shall be entitled to
have the assistance of counsel."6 In Massiah v. United States," the
Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated if
government officials "deliberately elicit" statements from an indicted
defendant without counsel present. 8 Although the holding of Massiah
provided a brightline rule, 9 the scope of the decision was limited:
Because the defendant had already been indicted and retained counsel,
lower courts construed the holding to apply only in those limited, postindictment, circumstances.20
On the heels of Massiah, the Court decided Escobedo v. Illinois,2 ' the
harbinger of Miranda. In Escobedo defendant had been arrested and
questioned about a murder. That day defendant's attorney obtained a
writ of habeas corpus, and defendant was released. Several days later,
he was rearrested. As defendant was being driven to the station, he
asked to speak with his attorney. His request was denied. Defendant's
attorney sought, in vain, to speak with his client during the questioning.
As the interrogation progressed, defendant was confronted with another
suspect in custody.22 During the confrontation, defendant stated: "I
didn't shoot [the victim], you did it."23 Afterward, defendant was
questioned for four hours, and eventually confessed. Defendant was
found guilty of murder, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal.2 4

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
59 (2d
21.
22.
23.
24.

Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
377 U.S. 201 (1964).
Id. at 206.
Id.
See JOSEPH COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED: PRETRIAL RIGHTS
ed. 1986).
378 U.S. 478 (1964).
Id. at 479-83.
Id. at 483.
Id.
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Writing for the majority, Justice Goldberg reasoned that the right to
counsel would be eviscerated if the guilt of the defendant was effectively
25
Aldetermined at an uncounseled, pre-indictment interrogation.
though the Court acknowledged the possibility that its holding would
reduce the number of confessions, the Court used this fact to justify the
application of the Sixth Amendment at the critical point in the criminal
The Constitution favors a defendant's privilege
investigations.26
against self-incrimination over the unfettered procurement of statements
by police; thus, an accused should be allowed to consult with counsel at
what may prove to be the outcome-determinative stage.27
The majority first posited that a confession-based system of justice is
historically "less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system
which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through
skillful investigation."2' Addressing the dissent's fear that the decision
would interfere with the functioning of the criminal justice system,
Justice Goldberg wrote:
[N]o system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to
depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication
through unawareness of their constitutional rights. No system worth
preserving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to
consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, these
rights. If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is something very
wrong with that system.29
The Court held that the right to counsel attaches prior to indictment,
when the investigation begins to focus on a particular suspect, the
suspect is in custody, the police "carry out a process of interrogations
that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements," the suspect asks
for and is denied an opportunity to communicate with his attorney, and
the police fail to explain to the suspect that he has a constitutional right
to remain silent.3" If all of the above elements are present, then a
statement given by the suspect is inadmissible because the procuring of
the statement violates the suspect's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.31 In addition to the normative rhetoric employed by Justice
Goldberg, the decision in Escobedo is noteworthy because the Court

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 487-88.
at 488.
at
at
at
at

489.
490.
490-91.
491.
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recognized the desirability of allowing suspects to make an informed
choice as to whether to give statements during interrogation.3 2 This
rationale was further developed in Miranda,but on a Fifth Amendment
basis.33 Before examining Miranda, a brief synopsis of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is necessary.
Currently, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches "at or after
the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated . . . 'whether by
way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment.'"3' 4
A violation of the Sixth Amendment occurs if,
following initiation of judicial proceedings, authorities "deliberately
elicit" a statement from a suspect in the absence of counsel. 5 The
justification for finding a violation at this point, instead of at trial, is
that the right safeguards the attorney-client privilege.36
C.
The Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause: Miranda v.
Arizona
The holdings in Miranda v. Arizona37 are well known. The government is barred from introducing, in its case-in-chief, statements of a
defendant obtained from a custodial interrogation unless the government
uses sufficient procedural safeguards to protect the accused's right
against self-incrimination."
Procedural safeguards require that the
accused be informed, prior to custodial questioning, that he has a right
to remain silent that may be exercised at any time, that any statement
given by him may be used as evidence against him in a court of law,
that he has a right to have an attorney present during questioning, and
that if he cannot afford to hire an attorney, one may be appointed for
him.39 The Court defined "custodial interrogation" as any questioning
begun by law enforcement officers after the accused has been taken into
custody or when the accused's freedom has been significantly deprived.4 °
The Court declared that if the accused either indicates that he does
not wish to answer any questions or requests the presence of an

32. See id. at 490 & n.14.
33. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439.
34. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 689 (1972)).
35. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
36. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985).
37. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
38. Id. at 444.
39. Id. at 444, 471-72.
40. Id. at 444.

1380

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

attorney, the interrogation must cease even though the accused had
previously agreed to answer questions. 4' Finally, the Court held that
the accused may waive his rights if the waiver is knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent.4 2 However, a "heavy burden" rests on the government
to establish that the waiver requirements have been met.43 These
statements represent the holdings of Miranda. The basis for these
holdings, whether constitutional or otherwise, will now be addressed.
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, began the opinion by
reviewing the Court's decision in Escobedo.44 After noting the spirited
debate and inconsistent applications that followed Escobedo, the Court
declared that the purposes of the Miranda decision were to further
explore how the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment is
implicated during in-custody interrogation and to "give concrete
constitutional guidelines" for courts and law enforcement officials to
consistently follow.45 The Court was careful to expressly reaffirm the
decision in Escobedo before continuing its analysis.46
The Court recited the language of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
and reviewed prior decisions focusing on the elevation of the privilege
against self-incrimination from a rule of evidence in England to a
constitutional decree in the states. 47 Following a brief synopsis of the
holdings, the Court again stated that it intended to decide a "constitutional issue" and proceeded to analyze police practices during custodial
interrogations.4"
Turning to later developments, Chief Justice Warren referred to police
practices of the 1930s. 49 The Court noted that police had previously
resorted to physical coercion, including whippings, beatings, hangings,
and lengthy isolation, to obtain confessions. 0 Recognizing that such
physical brutality was not wholly a past practice, the Court noted
several accounts of recent physical coercion.5' Although the Court

41. Id. at 444-45. In Michigan v. Mosley, the Court held that the government must
"scrupulously honor[]" the accused's assertion of the right to remain silent. 423 U.S. 96,
104 (1975).
42. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
43. Id. at 475.
44. Id. at 440.
45. Id. at 440-42.
46. Id. at 442.
47. Id. at 442-43 (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat 264, 387 (1821); Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591, 596-97 (1896)).
48. Id. at 445.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 445-46.
51. Id. at 446 & nn. 5-7 (citing New York v. Portelli, 205 N.E.2d 857 (N.Y. 1965)).
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conceded that physical coercion, while extant, was not presently widescale, it pointedly condemned the practice as demeaning to both the
then explored the psychological
accused and society.52 The Court
53
aspects of custodial interrogation.
Initially, the Court noted the privacy and, therefore, the inherent
secrecy of what actually transpires during interrogations.54 Confronted
with an information gap, the Court examined police manuals and guides
to ascertain current interrogation practice. 5 The manuals stated that
privacy was the chief factor responsible for obtaining confessions. 6 The
manuals instructed investigators to deprive the suspect of "'every
psychological advantage'" so that the suspect will be less likely to be
aware
of his rights and more disposed to divulge his criminal behav57
ior.
The officers conducting the interrogation are instructed to display an
air of confidence in the guilt of the suspect, to blame the victim or
another person for the crime, and to downplay the severity of the
offense.58 The manuals stress the importance of patience and perseverance on the part of the interrogator,5 9 and instruct the interrogator to
The manuals and texts also
offer legal excuses for the crime.'
recommend the "Mutt and Jeff" routine, where one officer acts in a
belligerent manner, and the other officer is friendly, so as to build a
rapport with the suspect and convince the suspect to talk with him.61
Other techniques noted by the Court include the use of trickery, such
as an arranged line-up,62 and how to deal with a suspect who asserts
his right to remain silent.' Should a suspect assert his right to remain
silent, the manual counsels the interrogators to readily concede the right
to the suspect, surprising him.' This concession has the added benefit
of impressing the suspect with the fairness of the interrogator and thus,

52. Id. at 447-48 (quoting IV National Commission on Law Observance and
Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement 5 (1931)).
53. Id. at 448-55.
54. Id. at 448.
55. Id. at 448-49.
56. Id. at 449 (quoting INBAU & REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS, at
1 (1962)).
57. Id. at 449-50 (quoting O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, at 99
(1956)).
58. Id. at 450 (citing INBAU & REID, supra note 56, at 34-55, 87).
59. Id. at 451 (citing O'HARA, supra note 57, at 112).
60. Id. (citing INBAU & REID, supra note 56, at 40).
61. Id. at 452 (citing O'HARA, supra note 57, at 104).
62. Id. at 453 (citing O'HARA, supra note 57, at 105-06).
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing INBAU & REID, supra note 56, at 111).
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builds rapport.65 However, after the suspect asserts his right, the
manual instructs the interrogator to inform the suspect of the import of
his refusal to talk, mainly the appearance of guilt.6" Following this
conversation, most suspects, if the manuals are to be believed, will
continue the interrogation. 7
Finally, the manuals detail how to
respond if the suspect requests to see a family member or an attorney.8 If the suspect requests a family member, the interrogator should
ask the suspect to tell him the truth and not get anyone else involved.6 9
If the suspect requests to speak to an attorney, the investigator should
counsel against getting anyone else involved
and should also caution the
70
suspect about the expense of an attorney.
After examining the psychological interrogation techniques and their
effects, the Court determined that custodial interrogation "exacts a
heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals." 7' The Court bolstered this conclusion by referring to the facts of
other confession cases. 72 The Court reasoned that the purpose of
present interrogation techniques was to break the will of the suspect, a
practice that is as "destructive of human dignity" as physical brutality.73 Therefore, the Court declared that custodial interrogation is
inherently coercive, and any statement obtained from such an interrogation is necessarily against the free will of the suspect.74 Having
established to its satisfaction the relationship between present day
interrogation techniques and the Self-Incrimination Clause, the Court
turned to the roots of the clause.75
The Court traced the origin of the privilege to the challenges to, and
later abolition of, the Court of Star Chamber, the English inquisitorial
court that required one to take the Oath of Star Chamber, an oath that
bound one to answer all questions asked.76 The framers of the Constitution were well aware of this system and guarded against it by

65. Id. at 454 (quoting INBAU & REID, supra note 56, at 111).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting INBAU & REID, supra note 56, at 112).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 455.
72. Id. at 455-56 (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307-10 (1963); Lynumn, 372
U.S. at 528; Haynes, 373 U.S. at 503).
73. Id. at 457.
74. Id. at 458.
75. Id. at 459-60.
76. Id. at 459. The Court also suggested that the Privilege had an even earlier, Biblical
beginning. Id. at 458 n.27 (citing Norman Lamm, The Fifth Amendment and Its Equivalent
in the Halakhan, 5 JUDAISM 53 (Winter 1956)).
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including the Self-Incrimination Clause in the Bill of Rights." Then
the Court characterized the privilege as a substantive right, and
concluded that it properly requires the government to carry the burden
of producing evidence against an individual "by its own independent
labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from
[the individual's] mouth.""8 Only this allocation, the Court reasoned,
would sufficiently protect and honor the dignity and integrity of the
individual.7 9
The Court then analyzed the privilege in the custodial interrogation
context to determine if it should apply at that stage of the investigation. o The Court stated that, after reviewing the current techniques
of police interrogation, it was satisfied that an individual subjected to
such techniques "cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to
speak."8 The Court then quoted language from its earlier decision in
Brain and concluded that the question had essentially been answered
seventy years earlier.8 2 The Court noted that following its decision in
Malloy v. Hogan,83 the Fifth Amendment privilege applied to the
states.8 4
The Court also noted that the voluntariness standard covered all
situations in which a suspect is prevented from exercising his free will
because of interrogation practices.8 8 The Court once again referred to
its decision in Escobedo.6 A primary component of the Escobedo
holding was the failure of the police to advise the suspect of his right to
remain silent.8 7 The Court stated that the waiver of rights was not
done knowingly not only because of the compelling nature of the
interrogation, but also because the suspect was not aware of what his
rights were. 8
Next, the Court discussed another aspect of the Escobedo decision-the
role of counsel.8 9 The Court reiterated that the officer's denial of

77. Id. at 459 n.29 (citing Pittman, The Colonial and ConstitutionalHistory of the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935)).
78. Id. at 460 (citing Chambers, 309 U.S. at 235-38).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 460-61.
81. Id. at 461.
82. Id. at 461-62 (quoting Bram, 168 U.S. at 542, 549).
83. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
84. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 463-64 (citing Malloy, 378 U.S. at 7-8).
85. Id. at 464.
86. Id. at 465 (citing Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 478).
87. Id. (citing Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 483, 485).
88. Id.
89. Id.
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Escobedo's request for counsel compromised Escobedo's ability to exercise
his constitutional right to remain silent.90 The presence of counsel
during custodial interrogation would have been sufficient to dispel the
atmosphere of inherent coercion and, thus, allow for the exercise of the
privilege.9 1 The exercise of the privilege implicated another part of the
rationale of Escobedo-the preservation of rights for trial.92 The Court
determined that the "presence of an attorney, and the warnings ...
enable the defendant under otherwise compelling circumstances to tell
his story without fear, effectively, and in a way that eliminates the evils
in the interrogation process."93
Without these early safeguards,
protections afforded at trial are meaningless because the defendant's fate
has already been sealed.9 4
The Court conceded that while it abdicated the approach of informing
the suspect of his rights with warnings, and honoring the exercise of
those rights, other potential alternatives existed.9 5 The Court declared
that it could not "say that the Constitution necessarily requires
adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the
interrogation process as it is presently conducted."96 The Court noted
that the warnings were not intended as a "constitutional straitjacket"
and encouraged Congress and state governments to create other methods
to effectively protect the rights of individuals. 9 However, the Court
immediately cautioned that the other procedures must be "at least as
effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in
assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it."98
In extolling the virtues of an initial warning of the right to remain
silent, the Court noted that the warning is necessary to make the
suspect aware of the right.9 9 A warning also makes the suspect aware
that the police will honor his rights should the suspect elect to exercise
them.'
The Court also noted the simplicity of giving a warning and
that unlike assessments of suspects' various capacities of comprehension,
a warning is an undeniable fact.'
Despite the benefits of the warning

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 465-66 (citing Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 481, 488, 491).
at 466.

(Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1961)).
at 467.

at 468.
at 468-69.
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of the right to remain silent, the Court deemed that the warning itself
was insufficient to protect Fifth Amendment rights;
therefore, the right
10 2
to counsel during interrogation is also necessary.
Before addressing the benefits of the presence of counsel, the majority
was careful to acknowledge that warnings delivered by an adversary are,
without more, insufficient to insure that an individual's decision to speak
or to remain quiet is "unfettered."'
The presence of counsel would
alleviate the atmosphere of coercion and would prevent police misconduct.'14 Furthermore, if coercive techniques are employed, the attorney may testify to that at trial.105 Presence of counsel would also help
ensure that any statements given are fully and accurately recorded.106
The majority declared that an individual is not required to request an
attorney prior to interrogation and that a failure to ask for an attorney
is not a waiver of that right.0 7 The reason for this determination, like
the rationale for informing a suspect of the right to remain silent, is that
a suspect who "does not know his rights and therefore does not make a
request may be the person who most needs counsel." 0 8 Thus, the
Court ruled that a suspect must be informed that he has a right to
consult with counsel prior to interrogation and to have counsel accompany him during interrogation.0 9 The Court added that the financial
capabilities of the suspect have no impact on the rights involved so that
an indigent suspect has a right to have counsel appointed and to be
advised of that right."0
The Court then addressed how the invocation of warnings following a
waiver would operate."' If a suspect indicates "in any manner" during
the course of an interrogation that he desires to exercise his right to2
silence or right to counsel, the interrogation must immediately stop."

Should questioning continue, the suspect's will would likely be overcome,
and the subsequent statement would be the product of compulsion." 3
If a suspect requests an attorney and the interrogation proceeds without
counsel, subsequent statements are only admissible into evidence if the

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 469.
Id.
Id. at 470.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 470-71.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 472-73.
Id. at 473-74.
Id. at 474.
Id.
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government can satisfy its "heavy burden" of proving that the suspect
knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights." 4 A waiver cannot be
presumed from a suspect's silence in the face of questioning."5 Also,
the Court declared that lengthy interrogation or an extended period of
"incommunicado incarceration" prior to questioning is "strong evidence"
that a subsequent statement is invalid." 6
The Court then noted that no distinction should be made between
inculpatory and exculpatory statements for purposes of exclusion, as
either type of statement could be detrimental to the suspect's case." 7
Furthermore, the Court stated that warnings are not required to be
given before conducting "[gleneral on-the-scene questioning."1 8 The
majority concluded by applying the warnings-and-waiver requirements
to the various cases before it and rendered judgments accordingly." 9
The majority opinion generated two primary dissents, the first
2
authored by Justice Harlan, 120 the second by Justice White.' '

Jus-

tice Harlan's dissent began by noting that the ultimate goal of the
22
majority's intricate scheme is to "discourage any confession at all."
This aim is misguided because precedent has established that the
23
Constitution requires only the Due Process voluntariness test.
Justice Harlan reviewed the various contexts under which the Court had
found a violation of that test, and then lauded the flexibility and caseby-case nature of the test.124 Turning to precedents, Justice Harlan
noted that instead of basing its decision on Fifth Amendment precedent,
the majority instead had relied almost exclusively on Sixth Amendment
and
cases.125 This practice, wrote Justice Harlan, was improper
26
indicated a lack of support for the majority's conclusion.1
Justice Harlan also noted that although the Court had often acknowledged in prior decisions that suspect interrogation was beneficial from
a societal perspective, 27 the current decision would hinder or altogeth-

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 475.
at 476.
at 476-77.
at 477-78.
at 491-99.
at 504-26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
at 526-45 (White, J., dissenting).
at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
at 505-07 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
at 508 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
at 510 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
at 509 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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er abolish the practice. 2 ' In conjunction with this problem, Justice
Harlan accused the majority of exaggerating the police abuses in an
effort to strengthen the conclusion, central to its holding, that custodial
interrogation is inherently coercive.129
Justice White's dissent likewise attacked the constitutional interpretation of the majority. 30 Justice White concentrated on the text of the
Self-Incrimination Clause, American and English common law, and the
precedents of the Court allowing introduction of an accused's statement
made during custodial interrogation, and found all authorities unsupportive of the majority's decision."3' While Justice White conceded that
the Court had the power to create new law and new public policy by
interpreting clauses of the Constitution,'3 2 he proceeded to examine the
legitimacy of the majority opinion from a precedential context.'
Again, he determined the new rule to be unfounded."M
Justice White concluded by predicting that dire consequences would
follow from the majority's ruling.'35 He stated that the warnings-andwaiver requirement would hinder efforts to apprehend, incarcerate, and
rehabilitate those individuals who most of society would deem deserving
of such treatment.3 8 Because of this result, the consequence of 137
the
decision would be an aggregate "loss" in human dignity, not a gain.
D.

Exceptions to the "Prophylactic"Rule

Almost immediately after its announcement, the Mirandadecision was
substantially undercut by gaping exceptions that were made possible by
a change in rationale. If the majority in Miranda left the basis for the
holding constitutionally vague, the Berger and Rehnquist Courts swiftly
characterized the rule as "prophylactic" and not constitutionally
based. 38 This interpretation of Miranda allowed the Court to chisel
away at the safeguards with little effort.

128. Id. at 516 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 517 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 526-31 (White, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 531 (White, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 531-37 (White, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 537 (White, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 537-43 (White, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 539-41 (White, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting).
138. See, e.g. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649 (1984).
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In Harris v. New York,' 39 the Court held that statements gathered
in violation of Mirandamay be introduced by the prosecution to impeach
the credibility of a defendant on the stand. 140 The majority, authored
by Chief Justice Berger, began by noting that the defendant had not
claimed that his statements were involuntary. 4 ' The Court then cited
Walder v. United States,' in which the Court held that physical
evidence that was inadmissible in the government's case-in-chief,
because of a Fourth Amendment violation, could be introduced for
impeachment purposes because of the different, non-affirmative nature
of the use. 4 The Court in Harris reasoned that the exclusion from
the prosecution's case-in-chief was sufficient to deter police violation of
Miranda.' Therefore, the Court concluded that further deterrence by
barring use of the statement completely was unnecessary. 145 A
violation of Miranda, wrote Chief Justice Burger, does not grant a
defendant a "right to commit perjury" by preventing the government
from introducing
prior inconsistent statements voluntarily given by a
46
defendant.

The dissent, per Justice Black, argued that use of the statements, even
for impeachment purposes, violated a central tenet of Miranda that no
distinction exists between incriminating statements used to impeach and
those used as direct proof of guilt.

4v

Justice Black also distinguished

the decision in Walder by noting that Walder only permitted introduction
of collateral impeachment evidence, unlike the present case in which the
evidence was direct. 4
The dissent concluded that the majority
decision undercut the purpose of Miranda-deterring police misconduct-and declared that the majority
was effectively aiding and abetting
49
constitutional violations by police.1
5 ° In
The Court expanded the holding of Harris in Oregon v. Hass."
Hass defendant was given Miranda warnings and, after making a few
statements, indicated that he wished to speak with an attorney. The
officer continued to question defendant, and defendant told the officer

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

401 U.S. 222 (1971).
Id. at 226.
Id. at 224.
347 U.S. 62 (1954).
Id. at 65.
Harris,401 U.S. at 225.
Id.
Id. at 225-26.
Id. at 230-31 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476-77).
Id. at 227-29 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 232 (Black, J., dissenting).
420 U.S. 714 (1975).
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where to find a missing bicycle. At trial the prosecution called the
officer to testify in rebuttal about statements defendant made after
requesting an attorney.'5' The Court held that the officer could testify
regarding the later statements even though defendant had requested an
attorney.5 2 Although the Court admitted that once the officer gives
the Miranda warning and then continues to question a suspect despite
the suspect's invocation of rights, the officer has little to lose and much
to gain, the Court classified this situation as "speculative."'
As in
Harris, the Court reasoned that Miranda was not designed to allow
perjurious testimony and that the giving of the warnings and exclusion
54
from the case-in-chief is sufficient to deter police misconduct.
While the questioning of the constitutional rationale of Miranda was
subtle in Harris and Hass, the Court was more explicit in Michigan v.
Tucker.'55 In Tucker police arrested defendant on suspicion of rape
and asked if he knew for what crime he had been arrested, if he wanted
an attorney, and if he understood his constitutional rights. The police
failed to advise defendant that if he could not afford an attorney, one
would be appointed for him. Defendant told police that he understood
his rights and knew what crime he had been arrested on suspicion of
committing. Defendant then told police that he had been with a man
named Robert Henderson on the night of the rape. The police contacted
Mr. Henderson and obtained information from him that was harmful to
defendant. The trial court suppressed defendant's statements but
allowed Henderson's testimony. Defendant was subsequently
convicted
56
of rape, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal.
The Court in Tucker framed its inquiry as follows: whether the police
conduct had "directly infringed" defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination or, alternatively, whether the conduct merely
violated a "prophylactic rule" designed to protect the right.5 7 After
reviewing the history of the privilege, including the development of the
due process voluntariness test, the Court revisited the holding of
Miranda.' Specifically, the Court stated that the decision in Miranda "recognized that these procedural safeguards were not themselves
rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure

151. Id. at 715-17.
152. Id. at 722.
153. Id. at 723.
154. Id.
155. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
156. Id. at 436-37.
157. Id. at 439.
158. Id. at 439-44.
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that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected." 159
Having concluded that Miranda rights were prophylactic and that
defendant's statements were voluntary, the Court sought to determine
the proper consequence for violating Miranda.60
The Court began by considering the validity and purpose of a possible
sanction.16 The purpose of excluding evidence obtained by violating
the Fourth Amendment, the Court noted, is to prevent violations of the
right by "'removing the incentive to disregard it.'"162 Although the
Court conceded that the rationale for the exclusionary rule of the Fourth
Amendment would seem to apply to the Fifth Amendment as well, the
Court stated that exclusions under the Fifth Amendment were designed
to deter purposeful or careless behavior that results in the deprivation
of a right."l The Court suggested that if the police act in good faith,
then the deterrence rationale is weakened.'6 Because the police in the
present case had acted in good faith, exclusion of defendant's statements
alone, not exclusion
of Henderson's testimony, was sufficient to deter
165
police misconduct.
The Court hastily dispensed with the other justification for excluding
evidence in the self-incrimination context-untrustworthiness.'1
Because no evidence of coercion, physical or psychological, was presented, and because the character of the evidence itself was not an inculpatory or exculpatory statement of defendant, the Court concluded that no
danger of untrustworthiness existed in the evidence.' 67
The Court flatly rejected defendant's argument that the Fifth
Amendment required exclusion of the evidence because the government
must make its case without the help of the defendant."6 The Court
noted several prior decisions that allowed the government to require the
defendant to produce physical evidence that may be used against
him. 1 69 The Court further discounted defendant's argument because
the evidence was not a statement by defendant himself, but evidence

159. Id. at 444 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).
160. Id. at 444-45.
161. Id. at 446.
162. Id. (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
163. Id. at 447.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 448.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 449.
168. Id. at 449-50 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964);
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460).
169. Id. at 450 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973)).
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that was uncovered because of his statements. 170 The Court declined
to elaborate on this point, however.
In conclusion, the Court stated that the "strong interest" of justice in
having any trustworthy and material evidence available outweighed
defendant's interests ' 1 and held that Henderson's testimony was
admissible.' 2
Justice Douglas dissented and proclaimed that the Court's earlier
holding in Miranda that "the 'requirement of warnings and waiver of
rights [are] fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege'"'7 3 was necessarily constitutionally based. 7 4 Justice Douglas
argued that had it not been constitutionally based, the Court would not
have had the authority to reverse the defendant's conviction because the
rule was applied to the state of Arizona.' 75 Thus, the Court's characterization of the Miranda violation as only a violation of "prophylactic"
measures was unwarranted.'76 Justice Douglas compared the fruits
of the Miranda violation with the statements made by defendant in
Wong Sun v. United States 7 and stated that Henderson's statement
was, similarly, a fruit of a constitutional violation and required
exclusion."17

The majority's characterization of Miranda rights as "prophylactic"
gained support in many of the Court's subsequent decisions, including
New York v. Quarles.' 9 In Quarles police entered a grocery store to
investigate a reported rape suspect. The police had been told that the
suspect was armed. Officer Kraft came upon the suspect at the rear of
the store, handcuffed the suspect, holstered his own firearm, and frisked
the suspect. The frisk revealed an empty shoulder holster. Before
informing the suspect of his Miranda rights, Officer Kraft asked the
suspect where the gun was.'° The suspect responded by nodding in
the direction of some nearby liquid soap cartons and said, "the gun is
over there."'8 ' The suspect's statement and the gun were excluded by

170.

Id.

171. Id. at 450-51.
172. Id. at 452.
173. Id. at 462 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476).
174. Id. at 462-63 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 462 (Douglas, J., dissenting). This argument is more fully explored in the
discussion of Dickerson v.United States, infra notes 265-72.
176. Id. at 462-63 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
177. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
178. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 463-64 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
179. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
180. Id. at 651-52.
181. Id. at 652-53, 675.
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violation of Miranda,and that
the trial court as having been obtained in
182
decision was affirmed twice on appeal.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, conceded that the suspect
was in police custody and that Miranda was triggered. 8 ' However, the
majority again characterized the Miranda warnings as "prophylactic"
and noted that the warnings were necessary prior to custodial interrogation only to provide "practical reinforcement" for the underlying Fifth
The majority emphasized that the suspect had
Amendment right.'
given had actually been compelled due
not claimed that the8statement
5
to police misconduct.

Because of this rationale and the underlying facts of the case, the
Court fashioned a "public safety" exception to Miranda."6 The Court
held that the suspect's statement and the gun were admissible in the
prosecution's case-in-chief despite the officer's failure to first give the
suspect Miranda warnings.8 7 The Court reasoned that while the gun
remained hidden, it posed a threat to the public because a customer or
employee might discover it, or an accomplice might use it. 88

The

Court declined to inquire into the actual motivation of the particular
officer and instead ruled that the public-safety determination must be
made on an objective basis. 8 9 The Court compared the social cost of
fewer convictions employed by the Court in Mirandato the added social
cost of endangering the public and determined that the added cost "outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.""9 The Court recognized
that the exception would obscure the clarity of Miranda but professed a
faith in the police to recognize when the exception was triggered and to
act within its scope.' 9'
Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent, accused the majority of
allowing, for the first time, the introduction of coerced statements into
evidence in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 9 2 The dissent first took
issue with the majority's characterization of the facts of the case and
contended that no member of the public was ever in danger from the

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 652-53.
at 655.
at 654 (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444).
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

655-56.
659-60.
657.
656.
657.
658-59.
674 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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hidden gun because of the late hour.193 The dissent then alleged that
the majority opinion misread the Court's decision in Miranda.94
According to Justice Marshall, the Court in Miranda never engaged in
a balancing of social costs. 195 Instead, the Court was concerned solely
with the "proscriptions of the Fifth Amendment, and, in particular,
whether the Self-Incrimination Clause permits [prosecution of] individuals based on statements [given during] custodial interrogations."9 6
The Court in Miranda,Justice Marshall continued, created a "constitutional presumption" that custodial interrogations were inherently
coercive, and thus, resulting statements were deemed compelled in
violation of the Fifth Amendment.'9 7 Because the majority failed to
establish that interrogations conducted for public safety are less coercive
than other custodial interrogations, the dissent argued, the majority
effectively allowed the introduction of coerced statements.' 9 Justice
Marshall concluded that the majority decision in Quarles was in "direct
conflict" with the dictates of the Fifth Amendment.'9
The Court again relied on the "prophylactic" characterization of
Miranda warnings to reach its result in Oregon v. Elstad. °° The
eighteen-year-old defendant in Elstad was placed under arrest in his
living room on suspicion of burglary. While there, and prior to giving
defendant his Miranda warnings, one of the investigating officers told
defendant that he felt that defendant was involved.20 In response,
defendant told the officer: "Yes, I was there."0 2 Later, defendant was
taken to the station house and read his Miranda rights. Defendant
waived his rights and gave a full statement, implicating himself in the
burglary.2 °3
At trial defendant moved to exclude his statements
contending that the first was taken in violation of his Miranda rights
and effectively let the "cat out of the bag," thus tainting the subsequent
statement under the "fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree" doctrine. 204 The trial
court suppressed the first statement but admitted the later statement.
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision and

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 675-76 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 681 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 682.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 683 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 684-85 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 686 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985).
Id. at 301.

202.
203.

Id.
Id.

204. Id. at 302.
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excluded the later statement, holding that it was tainted by the prior
illegality." 5
The Supreme Court, per Justice O'Connor, reversed.0 8 The Court
began its analysis by declaring that the appellate court had failed to
recognize the difference between the "fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree" doctrine
in the context of an infringement of a constitutional right-such as in
the Fourth Amendment context-and in a violation of Miranda. °7 The
Court quoted language from the majority opinion in Quarles which
stated that Miranda warnings were "prophylactic" in nature and only
allowed for enforcement of Fifth Amendment rights."' Defendant's
claim that the later statement was tainted necessarily assumes the
violation of a constitutional
right." 9 This assumption, wrote Justice
210
O'Connor, was ill-founded.

"The Miranda exclusionary rule... serves the Fifth Amendment and
sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself."21 The Fifth
Amendment only prohibits the use of compelled testimony."2 As
coercion, and thus, compulsion, is presumed in custodial interrogation,
failure to give Miranda warnings operates to exclude the use of
statements that may not have actually been compelled or coerced. 1 3
A defendant who gives an uncompelled statement may have the
statement excluded even though his constitutional rights were not
violated.214 The majority then referred to the decision in Tucker.21 5
The Court, like in Tucker, noted that an absence of actual coercion
militates against extending Miranda's exclusionary rule because the
evidence is trustworthy and exclusion would not deter police misconduct.2 6 The Court reasoned that the rationale of Tucker should extend
to situations in which the tainted "fruit" is the defendant's own
statement.21' Defendant was free to exercise his will in determining
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207.
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214.
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302-03.
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305 (quoting Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654 (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444)).
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whether to answer police; thus, the Court held that extending Miranda's
exclusionary rule was unwarranted.2 18
The majority discounted the "cat-out-of-the-bag" rationale relied on by
the Oregon Court of Appeals in suppressing the later statements.219
The appellate court suppressed the statements because it determined
that the psychological impact of the first statement had a continuing
effect of compulsion on defendant that contributed to the making of the
later statements.2 20 The Court conceded that "'after an accused has
once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no matter what the
inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical
disadvantages of having confessed. He can never get the cat back in the
bag.' ' 22' However, the Court stated that even though the later statement may be considered the fruit of the earlier, no prior decision had
held that a noncoerced confession of a guilty secret is deemed compelled
or makes a subsequent statement involuntary and excludable.222
Instead, the Court declared that any causal connection between the
giving of the22 ' unwarned statement and the later confession was
"speculative."

Because of the difficulty in ascertaining the connec-

tion between the earlier, psychologically damaging statement and the
later statement, exclusion of the later statement was unwarranted.2 4
The Court concluded that unless authorities engage in coercive or
otherwise improper tactics to obtain an initial statement, the fact that
a suspect gives an unwarned statement is not presumed to be the result
of compulsion. 225 The giving of Miranda warnings following an unwarned statement is sufficient "to remove the conditions that precluded
admission of the earlier statement."22' The defendant asserted that
because he believed his earlier statement could be used against him, the
officer should have informed him of the inadmissibility of the statement. 22 ' The Court classified such an additional disclosure as unworkable.2 28
In conclusion, the Court held that a suspect who has given an
unwarned but noncompelled statement retains the ability to waive his

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 309.
Id. at 311.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1947)).
Id. at 312.
Id. at 313.
Id. at 312-14.
Id. at 314.
Id.
Id. at 316.
Id.
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rights and give a confession following advisement of his Miranda
rights. 9 Instead of focusing on the unwarned statement, the Court
counseled that the inquiry should center on the voluntariness of the
later statement. 2m The Court was careful to note that the holding was
not intended to sanction even good-faith failures to administer Miranda
warnings.23 1
Justice Brennan dissented, arguing that the majority's labeling of the
connection between the unwarned confession and the later confession as
"speculative" departed from established precedent.232
The dissent
predicted that the majority opinion would lead to "disastrous consequences"' that would substantially weaken the scope and effectiveness of Miranda warnings.2 34 If police are free to disregard Miranda
at the outset of the interrogation without invalidating a later Mirandized
statement, then the practice will become widespread, and the rights
embodied in the warnings will be destroyed by circumvention.235
Justice Brennan next took issue with the majority's labeling of the
"cat-out-of-the-bag" rationale as "speculative." 23' Reviewing numerous
precedents of the Court and lower federal and state courts, Justice
Brennan reached the common-sense conclusion, as had the cited
authorities, that the later confession is causally linked to the earlier, unMirandized statement.237
In particular, he referenced the Court's
23 9
decisions in Darwin v. Connecticut' and United States v. Bayer,
among others, for the proposition that the first confession may have a
"decisive psychological impact in undermining the voluntariness of a
suspect's" subsequent statements.2 4
Precedent aside, numerous
psychological expert opinions, and the realities of police interrogation
methods, are consistent with the view that the earlier statement enables
authorities to elicit a later statement.24 '
Instead of the majority's determination that the warnings are
themselves sufficient to dispel any coercion from the improperly obtained
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230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
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Id. at 318.
Id.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 319-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 321-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 324-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
391 U.S. 346, 349 (1968).
Bayer, 331 U.S. at 540.
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 326 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 328-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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earlier statement, Justice Brennan correctly noted that numerous federal
courts place the burden on the prosecution to demonstrate that the taint
has been sufficiently dispelled. 42 Not content to rely on lower federal
courts for authority, the dissent also noted several successive confessions
decisions by the Court in which the prosecution bore the burden of
demonstrating that the second statement "was an act independent of the
[earlier] confession."2" Factors that the Court had previously used to
determine whether the second-confession taint was dissipated from the
prior illegality include: advice that the earlier statement is inadmissible,2 " whether the second statement was removed in time and place
from the first,245 the presence or absence of intervening factors,2"
and whether the police had acted purposely or flagrantly in disregard of
the law.247 Justice Brennan rejected the majority opinion because it
required consideration of none of these factors and instead established
the presumption that the taint of the first ill-gotten statement had
dissipated.2 "
Justice Brennan cautioned that the rationale of the majority was at
odds with Fourth Amendment exclusion law concerning the effects of an
unlawful arrest on later statements and feared that if the rationale of
in other contexts, it would contravene
the majority were to be introduced
249
too.
principles
settled
those
Following the decisions in Harris, Tucker, Quarles, and Elstad, the
Miranda warnings were characterized by a majority of the Court as
"prophlylactic" safeguards designed to protect the underlying Fifth
If the Court in
Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.
Miranda had intended a constitutional basis for the warnings, such
rationale was ignored, at least by a majority of the Court. This was the
state of Fifth Amendment confessions jurisprudence prior to the Court's
decision in Dickerson v. United States.25 °

242. Id. at 322, 335 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 325 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Reck, 367 U.S. at 440, 444 (1961)
(citing Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 710 (1967); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 561
(1954))).
244. Id. at 338 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 339-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 341-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 342 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 343-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Wong Sun, 431 U.S. at 486).
250. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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DICKERSON V. UNITED STATES

In Dickerson the Court was confronted with a challenge to the
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3501.251 Defendant was charged with
various offenses including bank robbery. Prior to trial, defendant moved
to suppress statements he had made to a Federal Bureau of Investigation officer because he had not been given Miranda warnings before he
made the statements. The district court granted the motion, but the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. The
appellate court recognized that defendant had not been given Miranda
warnings but determined that Congress had authority to overrule
Miranda because the holding was not constitutionally based. Congress
exercised this authority when it enacted § 3501.252 The federal statute
permitted the introduction of voluntarily given statements, regardless of
whether Miranda warnings had been given. 253 The Fourth Circuit
found that defendant's statement was, in fact, voluntarily given and was
therefore admissible.2 54
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, reviewed the Due
Process voluntariness test and its roots in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 255 The Court noted that its decision in Miranda recognized that coercion was inherent in custodial interrogation and that this
conclusion led the Court to announce "constitutional guidelines" to direct
law enforcement agencies.2 56 Then the Court discussed the history of
§ 3501.257
The Court concluded that the text of § 3501 designated the voluntariness inquiry as the "touchstone of admissibility."25 8 Also, the statute
did not contain any warning provision and allowed trial courts to
consider a variety of factors in determining admissibility.2 9 Because
of these features, the Court concluded, as did the Fourth Circuit, that
Congress had intended to overrule Miranda by enacting § 3501.21
Having divined Congressional intent, the Court next explored whether
Congress possessed the requisite authority to overrule Miranda.26 '
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253.
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255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000).
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 431-33.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3501.
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433.
Id. at 433-34.
Id. at 435 (quoting Miranda,384 U.S. at 442).
Id. at 435-36.
Id. at 436.
Id.
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Id. at 437.
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The Court conceded that Congress could alter rules of procedure or
evidence for the federal courts provided that the rules were not
constitutionally required.1 2 However, the Court declared that Congress lacks authority to supersede decisions that interpret or apply the
Constitution. 26 3
Thus, the question becomes whether the rights
declared by the Court in Miranda were constitutionally required. 2"
The Court recognized that "language in some of our opinions" supports
the view that Miranda warnings are merely "prophylactic" safeguards,
not rights protected by the Constitution. 265 Nevertheless,
the Court
266
held that Miranda was a "constitutional decision."
The Court's initial reason for this conclusion was that the holding in
Miranda was applied to the states.6 7 If the decision in Miranda was
not constitutionally based, then the Court would not have had the
authority to apply its decision to state courts.268 Also supportive of the
constitutional classification of Miranda is language from that opinion
itself including such phrases as "constitutional guidelines" and "constitutional standards." 269 The Court noted that the legislative invitation
extended by the Court in Miranda evinced a desire to establish a
constitutional floor for protecting
self-incrimination rights, below which
270
the legislature could not go.
Chief Justice Rehnquist hastily dispensed with the Miranda exceptions of Harris and Quarles by noting that those decisions did not
indicate that Miranda was "not a constitutional rule" but instead that
"no constitutional rule is immutable."271
Addressing the Court's
decision in Elstad, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the Court's
decision not to apply the Fourth Amendment "fruits" doctrine did not
necessarily "prove that Miranda is a nonconstitutional decision, but
simply recognizes the fact that searches under the Fourth Amendment
are different from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth Amendment."2 72 The Court declined to elaborate further about how the fruits
analysis was different under each Amendment or to offer a basis for the
immutability observation. Seemingly, the Court only mentioned the
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(citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517-21 (1997)).
at 438.
(quoting Quarles, 467 U.S. at 653; Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444).
(citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491-94).
(citing Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991)).
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(citing Elstad, 470 U.S. 298) (emphasis added).

1400

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[V'ol. 55

exception cases to ensure their survival despite the decision in Dickerson.
Next, the Court invoked the doctrine of stare decisis to support its
The Court acknowledged that stare decisis is not an
holding."'
"inexorable command," particularly when interpreting a constitutional
provision, but the doctrine still demands "special justification" before the
Court may depart from established precedent.274 Although the majority was careful to declare that it might not agree with the rationale of the
Court in Miranda were it examining the case at present, the Court
nevertheless stated that subsequent cases had not "undermined
[Miranda's] doctrinal underpinnings" so that overruling it was required." 5 Instead of characterizing the exceptions to Miranda as
undermining the holding, the Court declared that the exceptions had
refined the over-reaching of the earlier case while leaving its core
holding-that unwarned confessions may not be introduced in the state's
case-in-chief-unblemished.2 76 The Court concluded that the holding
point where
in Mirandahad become "embedded in police practice to the
277
the warnings have become part of our national culture."
The Court began its final analysis by recognizing the overinclusiveness
problem inherent in the Miranda scheme: A voluntary statement made
by a defendant aware of his rights may be excluded.2 7 ' The Court then
noted that the problem with the rule called for by the statute under
review was that it provided no bright line to allow police officers to
easily comply with or for courts to consistently apply.2 79 Thus, the
Court held that Miranda was a "constitutional rule" that, due to stare
decisis, the Court refused to overrule. 8 °
Justice Scalia authored a vehement dissent.28 ' He began by condemning the majority for striking down § 3501 while failing to expressly
declare that the use of an un-Mirandized confession at trial violates the
Constitution.8 2 The reason for the omission, wrote Justice Scalia, was
that the scope of § 3501 is consistent with the scope of exclusion required

273. Id. at 443.
274. Id. (citing State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997); United States v. Intl Bus.
Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring)).
275. Id. (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989)).
276. Id. at 443-44.
277. Id. at 443 (citing Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1999) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)).
278. Id. at 444.
279. Id. (citing Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963)).
280. Id.
281. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
282. Id. at 445 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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by the Constitution and because several Justices in the majority had
previously written that a violation of Miranda is not necessarily a
violation of the Constitution.8 3 The failure to expressly equate a
violation of Miranda with a violation of the Constitution led the Court
2
to an exercise of extra-constitutional, "antidemocratic" power.'
The dissent continued its attack by focusing on the rationale of the
2 5
Court's decision in Miranda.
1
The dissent conceded that both the
majority and the dissent in Mirandaunderstood that the decision in that
case rested on constitutional grounds, regardless of the objectionability
of such a conclusion.286 Justice Scalia then challenged the interpretation that the Constitution required certain warnings, particularly the
warning with respect to counsel, as being textually unwarranted." 7
The primary fault the dissent found with Miranda's constitutional
interpretation is with its "palpable hostility to the act of confession per
se, rather than toward what the Constitution abhors, compelled
confession." 2s ' However, Justice Scalia stated that the Court had
abandoned its view of Miranda as constitutionally required soon after
the decision was announced.8 9
The dissent catalogued and discussed the various exceptions that the
Court had declared with respect to Miranda compliance and noted the
prophylactic characterization of those opinions.290 The dissent noted
that the majority opinion in Quarles took care in declaring that "if the
Miranda warnings were an imperative of the Fifth Amendment itself,
such [a public safety] exception would be impossible, since the Fifth
Amendment's bar on compelled self-incrimination is absolute, and its
'strictures, unlike the Fourth's are not removed by showing reasonableness.'" 291' The dissent concluded its review of the exception cases by
accusing the majority of ignoring the fact that Miranda's nonconstitutional characterization was essential to the holdings of virtually all of
the exception cases.292

283.
284.
285.
286.
510-12,
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 445-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 447 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Miranda, 487 U.S. at 460-67).
Id. at 447-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Miranda,487 U.S. at 457-58, 460-67,
535).
Id. at 448-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 450 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 451-54 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 453 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Quarles, 467 U.S. at 653 n.3).
Id. at 454 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Next, the dissent chided the majority for its failure to offer an
alternative basis for the holdings in the exception cases. 293
The
majority's offering that "no constitutional rule is immutable" with
regards to Harris and Quarles, and the statement that searches
conducted pursuant to the Fourth Amendment are "different" from
interrogation under the Fifth Amendment with regards to Elstad are
both "true, but supremely unhelpful." 29 The dissent contended that
the "only reasoned basis" for the exception cases was that a violation of
Miranda did not necessarily entail a constitutional violation.295
The majority's stare-decisis argument, wrote Justice Scalia, is
unpersuasive because while the cases applying Miranda to the states
would have to be reconsidered if that decision is not constitutional, the
exceptions based on the understanding that Miranda is not constitutionally required will have to be re-examined if Miranda is held to be
constitutionally required. 296 Therefore, regardless of how the Court
holds, past decisions will necessarily require re-examination.2 97 Also,
argued the dissent, the majority's reliance on the fact that Miranda was
applied to the states is illegitimate in determining whether the warnings
are constitutionally based because the majority is assuming constitutionality without endeavoring to divine whether constitutional classification
was initially proper.295
Justice Scalia concluded his dissent with repeated volleys and insults
at what he considered to be a decision in which the Court allocated to
itself power not granted by the Constitution.2
IV.
A.

DICKERSON LAYS THE FOUNDATION FOR CHANGE

Does the Rescue of Miranda Really Matter?

Although the decision in Dickerson spared Miranda, current Fifth
Amendment confessions jurisprudence is fraught with problems and
uncertainties.
The underlying constitutional basis for Miranda,
especially in light of the obtuse opinion by the Court in Dickerson,
remains suspect. The Court declared that Miranda is constitutional
because it applied to the states and because of stare decisis.3 " As

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 454-55 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
at 455 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
at 456 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
at 456-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
at 439-40, 443-44.
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Justice Scalia stated in his dissent, both of these pronouncements are
circular in reasoning.3"' Another problem resulting from the decision
in Dickerson is the status of the various exceptions to Miranda. As
noted in Section III, the holdings in Elstad, Quarles, and Hass, among
others, all relied on the characterization of Miranda safeguards as
prophylactic-a rationale since rejected by the Court.0 2 Finally, and
most importantly, the effectiveness of the Mirandawarning scheme itself
remains problematic for numerous reasons. The first of these issues is
the constitutional basis for Miranda.
1. Miranda's Dubious Constitutional Pedigree. The constitutional basis for the Miranda safeguards is the Fifth Amendment's
prohibition against compulsion in a criminal case. From the time that
the initial dissents were filed by Justices Harlan and White in Miranda
until today, many Justices and scholars have questioned whether the
Constitution, much less the Self-Incrimination Clause, requires or even
permits the famous warnings.3 3 The rationale is generally problematic on two points. First, it is uncertain whether the extension of the
rights to a custodial interrogation was warranted. Some opponents
argue that the Self-Incrimination Clause was meant only to apply when
a defendant was questioned at trial.30 4 Second, the argument runs
that the Fifth Amendment only prohibits compelled statements.3 5 It
is difficult to understand, opponents contend, how an answer by a
defendant with knowledge of his rights to a question posed by an officer,
without more, is compelled. 30 6 Thus, the rationale in Miranda is
questionable from a textual perspective and from a historical perspective.
The reply to these arguments is largely pragmatic and is found in the
majority opinion in Miranda. The point is that even if Dickerson
declared, once and for all, that some safeguards are constitutionally
required at the custodial interrogation stage, the Miranda warning-andwaiver scheme is not likely to be invulnerable from continued constitutional scrutiny.

301. Id. at 456 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
302. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 305; Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654; Hass, 420 U.S. at 722-23.
303. See, e.g., Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 448-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 530-31 (White, J., dissenting).
304. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994, 2000-01 (2003).
305. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 448-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
306. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 510-11 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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2. Can or Should the Exceptions Survive Dickerson? The Court
in Dickerson was careful to cite Harris and Quarles with the comment
that "no constitutional rule is immutable," seeming to indicate continued
approval of those exceptions.3 0 7 Likewise, the Court observed with
regard to Elstad that the decision not to use the "fruit-of-the-poisonoustree" analysis did not indicate that Miranda was nonconstitutional, but
only that the evidence excluded pursuant to the Fourth Amendment is
However, as the
different from Fifth Amendment statements. 8
dissent in Dickerson 9 and other lower courts310 have noted, the
constitutional classification of Miranda seriously undermines the core
rationale of the earlier exceptions, to the point that the earlier cases may
require overruling if challenged.
The Court will likely address this issue, at least with respect to
Elstad, when it decides the companion cases of United States v.
Patane3 ' and Missouri v. Seibert,312 having decided the other companion case of Fellers v. United States3 13 on Sixth Amendment
grounds. 314 Should the Court decline to overrule Elstad, which seems
likely, the rationale employed will necessarily be inconsistent with that
espoused by Justice O'Connor in Elstad. The Court may attempt to
distinguish Elstad because the evidence introduced in that case was the
defendant's own statement instead of physical evidence.315 This kind
of distinction would do little to repair the damage done to Elstad by
Dickerson. The continued existence of the exceptions are further
addressed in Section IV-B of this Comment.
Miranda's effects have been
3. How Effective is Miranda?
intensely scrutinized. A recent study conducted by Professor Richard
Leo in three California police departments is informative.3 16 The study
revealed that of the 182 Mirandized suspects observed, only thirty-eight
suspects invoked their Miranda rights.317 However, only two of the

307. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 456.
308. Id. at 441.
309. Id. at 454-55 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
310. See, e.g., United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 2002).
311. 304 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 1788 (2003).
312. 93 S.W.3d 700 (Mo. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2091 (2003).
313. Fellers v. United States, No. 02-6320, 2004 WL 111410 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2004).
314. Id. at *4.
315. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 301.
316. Richard A. Leo, The Impact of MirandaRevisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
621 (1996).
317. Id. at 653.
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thirty-eight invocations, one percent, came after police had begun
questioning.3 18 Another study conducted by Professors Paul Cassell
and Bret Hayman of 126 suspects in Utah found that only five suspects
invoked their Miranda rights after questioning had begun.319 In a
recent article, Professor William Stuntz persuasively argued that these
statistics could indicate that Miranda is not working because the
strikingly small number of invocations during interrogation are evidence
that suspects are unable to protect themselves in the coercive atmosphere that follows the waiver. 20
Likewise, Professor Michael Seidman argues that Miranda is
ineffective.32 1 Professor Seidman maintains that Miranda actually
enables coercive interrogation practices to continue because courts
routinely stop their inquiry after discovering that the suspect was
warned, thus allowing police to have their way with the suspect after a
waiver.322 If a warning has occurred, courts wrongly conclude that the
3 23
suspect has been given a readily employable tool to protect himself
As evidence of this practice, Professor Seidman notes that the Supreme
Court has reversed only two convictions on the grounds that a postMiranda statement was involuntarily procured.32 4 When a comparison
is made between those two reversals and the twenty-three reversals
determined to be violative of due process during a similar time period
prior to the Court's decision in Miranda, the Court's attitude is
apparent.3 25 Moreover, the Court has expressly stated in Berkemer v.
McCarty326 that "cases in which a defendant can make a colorable
argument that a self-incriminating statement was 'compelled' despite the
fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of

318. Id.
319. Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An
Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 859-60 (1996).
320. William J. Stuntz, Symposium, MirandaAfter Dickerson: The Future Concession
of Law, Panel Three: Miranda's (Ir)relevance,Miranda's Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975,
988-90 (2001). Professor Stuntz also argues that the statistics may indicate that Miranda
has no effect on coercive police questioning because police are instead self-regulated by
.police culture, professionalism, and politics." Id. at 990. This conclusion may be
questionable because of the observance of the questioning, a narrow definition of"coercion,"
or because of an indirect pressure of the threat of Miranda.
321. Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673 (1992).
322. Id. at 744-46.
323. Id. at 745-46, 746 n.241.
324. Id. at 745, 745 n.239 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991); Mincey
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978)).
325. Id. at 745, 745 n.240.
326. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
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Miranda are rare."327 Thus, the soundness of Professor Seidman's
conclusion is inescapable.
One understands more clearly why the miniscule number of suspects
invoking their rights during questioning is troubling when one considers
the tactics used in the post-waiver interrogation. Professor Welsh White
has noted three particularly troubling techniques employed by the police
when interrogating suspects that would likely fail the due process
voluntariness test, yet, because Miranda warnings have been given,
would not be sufficiently scrutinized by a court.328 The first tactic is
threatening force or promising leniency for cooperation. 29 While most
interrogation manuals do not advise officers to pursue this technique, if
it is used an increased likelihood exists that the subsequent statement
will be untrustworthy.3 3 0

The second technique is threatening harm

or criminal prosecution against family or friends. 1 Obviously, this
technique is rife with potential for abuse regardless of whether the
officer actually intends to take the friend or family member into
custody.3 2 The third and final technique discussed is misrepresenting
the type or strength of evidence against the suspect.13 If the misrepresentations of evidence are repeated, or involve physical evidence, a
suspect might believe that resisting questioning would be futile, and
thus, acquiesce in questioning. 33 A suspect's statements made
under
33
this atmosphere would likely be unreliable and involuntary.
These techniques become even more objectionable when one considers
the emotional context in which they are employed and upon the
realization that the techniques, as Professor White notes, are used in
combination.336

Of course, many other post-waiver interrogation

techniques may be imagined that, while not sufficiently egregious to
warrant classification as violative of due process, may nonetheless subtly
overcome a suspect's will. Chief among these techniques is the use of
trickery or the deliberate misrepresentation of facts to a defendant.

327.

Id. at 443 n.20.

328. Welsh S. White, Symposium, Miranda After Dickerson: The FutureConcession of
Law, Panel Six: Deceptive Police Practices: How Far is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211,
1233-46
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

(2001).
Id. at 1233-40.
Id. at 1235-36.
Id. at 1240-42.
Id. at 1241-42.
Id. at 1242-46.
Id. at 1243-45.
Id. at 1246.
Id. at 1233.
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The aforementioned techniques are problematic with respect to
Miranda for two primary reasons. First, in the case of the techniques
mentioned by Professor White, Miranda allows police officers to simply
read a short litany of phrases and then, should the suspect waive his
rights, for whatever reason, begin to use techniques that are so coercive
that they might violate the Due Process voluntariness test. This abuse
is possible because if the suspect was read his Miranda rights, the
reviewing court usually relaxes its inquiry into the interrogation
techniques regardless of their coercive nature. This relaxed review is
essentially, if subconsciously, based on the view that the suspect knew
that he did not have to answer any of the questions and thus did not
experience any coercion. If the suspect had felt coerced, surely he would
remember that he was free to terminate the interrogation at any time.
As the research conducted by Professor Leo and Professors Cassell and
Hayman indicates, this rationale is ill-founded. The rarity of the
invocation of rights during interrogation leads to the conclusion that a
suspect is not capable, once having waived his Mirandarights, to assert
them during interrogation, regardless of the presence of coercion. The
next logical question is "why?"
One possibility for the lack of invocations could be that the interrogations are simply not coercive. While this may sometimes be the case, the
possibility that all of the interrogations observed in the various studies
were wholly free from coercion at all times is slim. Another, more likely
possibility is that the suspect is incapable of asserting his rights. As
Professor Stuntz notes, the reliance on the suspect to monitor the
coercive environment to protect his rights is misplaced.33 If a suspect
really understood his rights at the time he was given the Miranda
warnings, he would assert those rights immediately.3"' Even suspects
who are factually innocent of the crime under investigation would be
better off invoking their rights and dealing with the authorities through
counsel. The facts of Escobedo demonstrate that even exculpatory
statements can be harmful if a prosecution is pursued. It follows that
if suspects are incapable of making this type of logical determination
prior to interrogation, then they are also less capable of making a
rational decision to exercise their rights during interrogation, especially
if the interrogation becomes severely coercive. 3 9 Thus, a lack of
understanding of the nature of the rights is present from the beginning
of custody and continues throughout the interrogation. Reading a
suspect the Miranda warnings may inform him that such rights exist,

337. Stuntz, supra note 320, at 991.
338. Id.
339. Id.
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but knowing that the rights exist and understanding how and when
those rights may be employed are not the same.
Along this same line is the possibility that even if the suspect is aware
of his rights and understands how to invoke those rights, the interrogation process may prevent the exercise of the rights. If the suspect is
being questioned for a prolonged period or if the questions or manner of
questioning is severe, he may not be capable of invoking his rights. He
may be shy or bashful by nature, or he may be fearful that while a court
might recognize such rights, his interrogators will not. Instead, the
interrogators will view his invocation as an invitation for abuse. Also,
a suspect may forget that invocation is an option. If studies regarding
eyewitness reliability are accurate, stressful situations negatively impact
a person's ability to store and recall information. ° If interrogations
are not only inherently stressful, but also inherently coercive, it seems
likely that the atmosphere during the interrogation would prevent recall
or accurate recall of what rights a suspect does or does not have.
Indeed, the suspect may erroneously believe that once the interrogation
has begun, he is not free to stop it.
The Court in Miranda sought to dispel the inherently coercive
atmosphere of police interrogations by informing suspects of their rights.
As this Section has made clear, merely informing suspects of their rights
is insufficient to dispel the coercive atmosphere. Knowledge is no
substitute for understanding. Also, even if suspects understand their
rights initially, little reason exists to conclude that they retain this
understanding as an interrogation continues. Not only does Miranda
fail to protect individual liberty by not ensuring some degree of
understanding and therefore thoughtful exercise of rights, the scheme
also enables interrogators to engage in practices that, sans warnings,
would otherwise be found to violate due process.
Thus, the current Miranda scheme is vulnerable to attack on both
constitutional and practical fronts. The constitutional attack stems from
a textual interpretation of the Fifth Amendment and the procedures
declared by the Court in Miranda. The practical front concerns
illogically equating knowledge of rights with an understanding that
allows for the exercise of those rights, and a presumption that knowledge
or understanding of the rights persists over time. Thus, Mirandastands
on unsteady ground, providing the illusion of protecting individual
liberty from societal harms.

340. See Note, "Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the
Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification," 29 STAN. L. REV. 969, 969-79 (1977).
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The Remedy: Counsel

Appropriately, a remedy to the failings of Miranda was first proposed
by the American Civil Liberties Union in an amicus brief submitted to
the Court during its consideration of that very case.34 ' One remedy
that should be considered is, instead of giving elaborate warnings,
requiring that a suspect meet with counsel prior to interrogation to
discuss his rights and options for exercising those rights and, should the
suspect agree to questioning, having counsel accompany the suspect
during the interrogation. The argument for counsel was appropriate in
1966 because Escobedo was decided on Sixth Amendment grounds, and
therefore, it would seem that Miranda would be decided on similar
grounds. Instead, the Court changed tracks and the Self-Incrimination
Clause became the focus of confessions jurisprudence. This Section
describes how the provision of counsel prior to custodial interrogation
could easily be extrapolated from the Constitution and how this
extrapolation is particularly appropriate considering the Court's recent
Also, this Section addresses the effect the
confessions decisions.
requirement of counsel would have on the exceptions to Miranda. This
Section concludes with a description of how the presence of counsel
would remedy the knowledge-understanding gap that plagues the
current scheme.
1. Constitutional Bases for the Proposal: Choose an Amendment. A requirement that counsel be provided to a suspect prior to
interrogation could be derived from the same clause that is the basis for
Miranda: the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause. The Fifth
Amendment states that a suspect in a criminal case may not be
compelled to incriminate himself.342 Most of the language of the clause
is relatively straightforward, with the exceptions being the words "case"
and "compelled." At least under the holding of Miranda,the Court has
interpreted "case" to encompass initial custody. 3 Providing counsel
at this point is precisely what the proposed measure would do, so no
additional interpretation is needed. As to the term "compelled," the
Court in Miranda reasoned that psychological coercion was inherent in
This conclusion is consonant with the
custodial interrogation.3"
The only difference between the proposal and
proposal as well.

341. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 22-25, Miranda,
384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 759).
342. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
343. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 471.
344. See id. at 458.
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Miranda's scheme is the requirement of a specific protective device.
Therefore, under the Court's current interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause, the proposal meets constitutional muster.
While Miranda is based on the Self-Incrimination Clause, a solution
to the interrogation problem need not be so constrained. The Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause could provide a basis for the presence
of counsel. Substantive due process analysis asks whether an action of
the state against an individual interferes with rights "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty."345 Admittedly, the Court in Palko declined
to hold that every violation of the Fifth Amendment necessarily satisfies
this standard.3 4 8 But, as the decisions in Escobedo14' and Miranda 34 suggest, the right of an individual to intelligently exercise
constitutional guarantees through assistance of counsel in an atmosphere where life, liberty, or property is sought to be deprived should be
implicit in our concept of due process.
Finally, the Sixth Amendment provides that an accused shall have the
assistance of counsel in a criminal prosecution. 34' The Court currently
interprets "criminal prosecution" to mean the time when an individual
is charged with a crime.3 5 0 This phrase could readily be interpreted
to cover custodial interrogation and provide the most direct constitutional sanction of the requirement of counsel. Because custody is usually the
first point at which the state confronts the suspect directly, the
conclusion seems rational. The Court has recently evinced a willingness
to extend the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in Alabama v.
Shelton,35 ' holding that a suspended sentence cannot be imposed
absent counsel or waiver of counsel. 52 Admittedly, that decision does
not extend the Sixth Amendment definition of initiation of prosecution
back in time, but the decision is indicative of a movement toward an
expansive reading of Sixth Amendment protections in general.
Therefore, perhaps the time is ripe to revisit the course the Court was
following when it decided Escobedo. Even the dissenting Justices in
Miranda acknowledged that the Court had historically interpreted the

345. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937).
346. Id. at 325-26.
347. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 487-90.
348. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455 ("[Clustodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on
individual liberty.").
349. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
350. See, e.g., Brewer, 430 U.S. at 398.
351. 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
352. Id. at 674.
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Constitution to create new law and public policy.353 "Indeed, [creating
new law] is what [the Court] must do and will continue to do until and
unless there is some fundamental change in the constitutional distribution of governmental powers. 354
2. Why Now? The decision in Dickerson indicates a willingness on
the part of most of the current Justices to continue applying Miranda
and its exceptions for better or worse. But Dickerson's center cannot
hold. If Miranda is constitutional, then the prophylactic rationale
underlying its exceptions is removed. The exceptions will remain
irreconcilable until and unless the Court can offer new reasons that
would somehow bring those cases in line with a constitutional Miranda
characterization. Regardless of what course the Court elects to take
regarding confessions, the Court will be charting new ground.
For instance, in Chavez v. Martinez355 the Court was forced, because
of Dickerson's constitutional characterization of Miranda, to decide
whether a violation of Mirandawas sufficient to state a claim under 42
The Court recently decided Fellers v. United
U.S.C. § 1983.356
While the Court decided Fellers on Sixth Amendment
States.35
grounds,35 holding that the officers "deliberately elicited" information
from an indicted defendant, the Court remanded the case for the lower
court to determine whether Elstad analysis applies after a waiver of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 359 Elstad's reasoning, already
questionable in its own context, may now be applied to another
constitutional violation.
As mentioned earlier, the Court will soon decide Missouri v. Sei36 1
In reaching its decision, the
bert36 ° and United States v. Patane.
Court will necessarily have to consider the continued viability of Elstad
in light of Dickerson. Perhaps this decision will help inform the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit when it decides Fellers,
but if the Court overrules Elstad, now very unlikely if the language in
Fellers is any clue, how will the appellate court evaluate its case?
Moreover, if Elstad is not overruled, how can the Court legitimately

353.
354.
355.
356.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 531 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. (White, J., dissenting).
123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003).
Id. at 2008 (Scalia, J., concurring in part in the judgment); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(2000).
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

Fellers v. United States, No. 02-6320, 2004 WL 111410 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2004).
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
93 S.W.3d 700 (Mo. 2002).
304 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 2002).
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substitute a new rationale for that expressly relied upon to decide that
case. And which rationale should the Eighth Circuit use in making its
determination-the rationale of the Court in Elstad or the rationale of
the Court in Seibert or Patane explaining, by alteration, the reasoning
of the earlier case?
Despite its best intentions, the Court did not successfully freeze
confessions jurisprudence with its decision in Dickerson.362 On the
contrary, for each exception challenged, the Court will be required to
fashion an unpersuasive rationale that will read exactly like the fiction
it is. The emperor has new clothes. One can only hope that these
inconsistencies, if they come to fruition, will be short-lived.
3. Bridging the Gap. The study results mentioned in section IV-A
Suspects
highlighted the shortcomings of the Miranda warnings."
are presumed to understand the rights just because they are given
knowledge of them. This presumption is specious both pre-interrogation
and during interrogation. Even presuming that knowledge equals
understanding, the stress of interrogation can diminish memory, hence,
depriving a suspect of all the benefits of the warnings. If a suspect is
required to meet with counsel prior to or as a condition of custodial
interrogation, these shortcomings will be allayed.
Counsel cannot only take time to explain the various rights both
before and during interrogation, something that law enforcement cannot
presently do, but can also prevent the memory problem by accompanying
the suspect during the interrogation. Should the suspect become unsure
about whether he must or should answer a question, the attorney will
be there to assist the suspect in making the decision. The presence of
the attorney would also serve as a check on coercive practices and
provide the suspect with a witness should coercive measures be used.
In short, the presence of counsel can guarantee that Justice Goldberg's
fears never materialize-that the criminal justice system does not, in
actuality, depend on the continued ignorance of rights and the fear to
exercise those same rights. With counsel, the suspect will have, for the
first time in some cases, an opportunity to make a knowledgeable and
informed choice, free from fear or ignorance.

362. See Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)FormulatingProphylactic Rules, Safe
Harbors and Incidental Rights in Constitutional CriminalProcedure, 99 MICH. L. REV.
1030, 1071 (2001).
363. See supra notes 316-20.
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C. Anticipated Responses to the Proposal
Of course this proposal will draw fire. Objections may include the
following: The cost of providing counsel will be excessive, the proposal
is not constitutionally required or permissible, the presence of counsel
will unnecessarily hinder a legitimate law enforcement technique, and
crime rates will skyrocket. Admittedly, the cost will be substantial.
However, the police would still determine whether, even assuming a
willing suspect, the interrogation would take place. Thus, the technique
would only be employed in necessary cases and costs would be kept
down. Also, having counsel present early in the criminal investigation
process could lead to expedited plea negotiations, thus lessening the
overall costs of the proposal. The constitutional arguments have largely
been addressed in the preceding discussion. Essentially, if Miranda is
a legitimate interpretation of the Constitution, then the requirement of
counsel would likewise be constitutional. The fears that crime will soar
and police investigation will be unreasonably circumscribed were present
when Miranda was first decided. In practice, it will be remembered that
Miranda had little impact on the effectiveness of police investigations.
The requirement of counsel will likely have a more pronounced effect on
interrogation procedures, but this does not prevent the police from
building their cases in other ways, such as by surveillance, wire-taps, or
the use of informants. What this proposal does prevent is police
capitalizing on an individual's fear or misunderstanding of his constitutional rights.
V.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately the decision whether to retain Mirandawith its exceptions,
to purge Miranda of its exceptions and leave it otherwise intact, or to
require counsel, will require a choice between the protection of suspects'
rights or the expediency of the criminal justice system. Only one
conclusion is certain. If any choice other than the requirement of
counsel is made, many suspects will be deprived of their life or liberty
because they, through no fault of their own, did not understand what it
means to exercise their rights or had forgotten that they still possessed
such rights. Society cannot, must not, acquiesce in a criminal justice
system that so operates.
BENJAMIN D. CUNNINGHAM
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